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Abstract
In a model on population and endogenous technological change, Kremer (1993) combines a 
short-run Malthusian scenario where the level of income determines the population that can be 
sustained, with  the  Boserupian  insight  that,   in  the long  run,  greater   population spurs 
technological change and can therefore lift a country out of its Malthusian trap. In this note we 
extend this model and show that a more realistic version of the model, which combines 
population and population density, allows deeper insights into these processes.  This model 
involves the explicit consideration of population density as an additional factor determining 
technological change.  The incorporation of population density, which is closer to Boserup’s 
insight of demand-driven technological change and is more consistent with theories of 
technological diffusion, allows a superior interpretation of the empirical regularities between 
the level of population, population density, and population growth.   Our model is also 
consistent with findings about technological change in different regions of the world which 
cannot easily be accommodated in Kremer’s original framework.    
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11. Introduction
Economic views on the impact of population have been dominated by two paradigms.  In 
the Malthusian paradigm, population growth that exceeds technological change ensures that 
societies are never able to escape subsistence levels of income.  In the Boserupian paradigm 
which is also found in some versions of endogenous growth models, the level of population 
determines the pace of technological change and thus can help countries escape the Malthusian 
trap.  
In a well-known article published in 1993, Michael Kremer combines these two paradigms 
to analyse the relationship between global population and population growth over the past one 
million years.  In particular, he combines a Malthusian equation where a given income level 
determines the population that can be sustained, with a technological change equation which 
posits that the level of population positively influences technological change, can thus lift the 
income constraint, and consequently allow population growth to take place. This model 
predicts a linear relationship between the growth rate of population and its absolute level, and 
he shows that this highly stylised model can describe the empirical relationship between these 
two variables from earliest times up to about 1960 surprisingly well. 
In various extensions to the model, Kremer addresses some of the unrealistic features of 
this basic formulation.  These extensions allow for some populous countries having rather low 
technological levels, for roughly constant technological change, for falling global population 
growth rates after 1960, and for rising per capita incomes, all of which are features of the 
contemporary world.  
In Kremer’s framework, technological change is dependent on the absolute level of 
population and, in the extensions, additionally on the level of income and technology.  We 
argue that it is more plausible to assume that technological change depends additionally on 
population density, as population density facilitates communication and exchange, increases 
the size of markets and the scope for specialisation, and creates the required demand for 
innovation, all of which should spur the creation and diffusion of new technologies (see also 
Becker et al. 1999).        
Within the general framework of Kremer’s model, we then extend the model by including 
population density as an additional factor influencing technological change.  This extension not 
only is able to still explain all of the empirical regularities noted by Kremer, but does so more 
plausibly and generates additional insights into the interactions between population and 
technological change.   It also provides a better explanation of differences in technological 
2levels between geographically separated regions and has more plausible policy implications. 
Lastly, data at a more a more disaggregated country or regional level show a clear correlation 
between population density in subsequent levels of per capita GDP, which cannot be easily 
accommodated in Kremer’s original model but is consistent with our extension that includes 
population density. 
The note is structured as follows. First, the simple version and the most important 
extension of the Kremer model is presented. Then we incorporate our extension, the additional 
consideration of population density in a generalised version of the model. New insights will be 
highlighted and interpreted and implications for current research in development economics 
emphasised.
2.  The basic model
Kremer’s simple version of the model is based on two fundamental assumptions: The first 
stems from the idea that technology is a public good because it has the property of non-rivalry, 
and, as Romer (1990) points out, blueprints are –at least as an input for further research 
activities- non-excludable. In this simple version, Kremer also assumes that each person’s 
research productivity is independent of population size.  As a result, there are more inventors 
in  larger  populations.  Combined with the  public  good   character  of  technology,  larger 
populations therefore exhibit higher growth rates of technology. 
The  second  assumption  is  related   to   Thomas  Malthus’  famous  1798  essay  on 
population. He observed that  population grows geometrically whereas food production 
increases only arithmetically. Through a process of alternating subsistence crises, where famine 
kills a large share of the population, and subsequent phases of expanding population, 
population and food production are held in balance.  The growth rate of population is thus 
limited by the state of food production, i.e. technological progress
1.
Combining the hypothesis that high population spurs technological change with the 
Malthusian view that technology determines population leads to the prediction that the growth 
rate of population is proportional to the size of population. Kremer finds empirical evidence for 
this prediction over most of human history.
1 According to Galor and Weil (1999), most of human history was characterised by this ”Malthusian Regime”. 
Only in the last 200 years, humans were able to leave the subsistence level and to create and accumulate 
wealth. 
3Formally, output (Y) is generated in a Cobb-Douglas type production process. Land 
(T) and population (P) are used as inputs. The output level also depends on the current state of 
technology (A).
2
(1) ) 1 ( T * P * A Y
a - a = ,   a > 0
After normalising T to one and dividing both sides by P, we obtain output per capita (y) as:
(1a) ) 1 ( P * A y
- a =
According to Malthus (1798), income per capita cannot exceed the subsistence level. In the 
case of good economic conditions, mortality would fall and more children would be born. An 
increase in output would therefore not lead to a rise in output per capita but to an increase in 
the size of the population.  In this version of the model, Kremer assumes that this process of 
population adjusting to economic conditions occurs instantaneously.  Per capita income can 
therefore be assumed as constant, implied by  y .
Equation (1a) can be solved for the equilibrium level of  the population size P.
(2) 











The following research equation (3) shows, that the chance to invent something new is 
dependent of population size, with each person having the same research productivity. The 
larger the level of population, the higher will thus be the growth rate of technology.





with  A A/   representing the growth rate of technology and g standing for research productivity 
per person.
In the next step we determine the growth rate of population. By assumption, the level 
of per capita income is constant, so its growth rate is equal to zero  (dlny(t) / dt = 0). Taking 
logarithms in (2) leads to 
(2a)  )) A ln( ) y (ln(
1
1
) P ln( -
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=
The growth rates are obtained by differentiating this term with respect to time. This 
leads to equation (4).












Substituting  A A/   from equation (3) in (4) shows the relationship between the growth rate of 
population and its size in (5).








This relationship between the growth rate of population and its size is shown in Figure 1. On 
the horizontal axis we plot the size of the world population for 1.000.000 B.C. until 1997. 
The vertical axis shows the corresponding average annual growth rate of the world’s 
population in percent.  Until about 1960 (when world population was about 3 billion), there 
appears to be a linear relationship between the two variables.
3   After 1960 when world 
population had reached about 3 billion people, populations growth stabilised and then fell.
4 
Fig. 1: Population and Population Growth, 1.000.000 B.C. to 1997.
Source: Kremer (1993) and UN (1998).
3 There are a few outliers in the middle ages where population growth rates were in three instances lower than 
one would have expected.  They are associated with the demographic impact of the Mongol invasions in the 
13
th century, the black death in the 14
th century, and the 30-years war and the fall of the Ming Dynasty in the 
17
th century. 
4 Kremer accommodates this period in one of his extensions of the model (see below).
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)This version of the model is based on very restrictive assumptions. Therefore, Kremer 
(1993) relaxes some of them in more generalised versions of the model. First, he takes into 
account that research productivity (g) may depend on income, i.e. be a function of income.  In 
particular, higher incomes may increase the research productivity per person. With this 
extension, it is possible to explain why some populous countries like China or India have 
comparatively low technological levels. Secondly, he takes the view of Jones (1992, 1995) that 
it is arbitrary to assume a linear relationship between the growth rate of technology and its 
level. Assuming an exponent of less than one for the technological level (A) in equation (3) is 
in line with a constant or declining total factor productivity in the post-war period. Thirdly, he 
relaxes the assumption that research productivity is independent of the size of the population. 
He formulates a research equation (3) which also contains an exponent attched to P, the 
population level. This is due to the fact that research productivity may increase with population 
as suggested by Kuznets (1960), Grossman and Helpman (1991) or Aghion and Howitt 
(1992).  Alternatively, at some level, research productivity may also decrease with population 
size because of redundant research activities. 
Thus the more general technological change equation becomes
5:
(3a)  1 A * P * g
A
A - f y
·
=
and the population growth equation becomes:
(5a) 
1 ) 1 )( 1 (
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For the empirical regularities observed in Figure 1 to be consistent with this equation, 
the exponent on P must be roughly equal to 1.  Given that f, the exponent of A, is smaller or 
equal to one, with a being approximately 2/3, y must be greater than 1, thus suggesting that 
the increases in research activity afforded by higher population outweigh the duplication 
effects.    
While Kremer motivates this extension as effects of higher population on research 
activities, his description of these effect, better intellectual contact and specialization and the 
development of cities, are really effects of population density, not primarily related to absolute 
population size.   Also, the arguments of Kuznets, Agion and Howitt, and Grossman and 
Helpman as well as Becker et al. (1999) relate primarily to the effects of population density on 
5 This is a very general formulation that would accommodate a variety of views on technological change 
including Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Jones (1992, 1995), Aghion and Howitt (1991), among others.
6technological change through its effect on more intensive intellectual contact, urbanization, 
exchange, and specialization, and through its effect on market size.  
Consequently, the next section introduces population density into this extended version 
of the model. It is intended to present a more plausible version, showing that not only 
population size, but also population density matters for technological progress.  This extension 
does add to the complexity of the model, but generates interesting new insights into the 
process of technological change and better explains the data. 
3.  Population density and technological change
The process of endogenous technological change, until now represented by equation (3a), may 
also be influenced by population density. For instance, a country with a large population may 
not possess a higher growth rate of technology than a country with a medium sized population, 
because the population density in the second country is higher. This may be true because the 
need to invent new technologies from a Boserupian (1981) point of view will be higher in the 
second country, compensating the disadvantage of having less inventors in absolute terms. The 
speed of communication, the diffusion of knowledge, and division of labor could also be higher 
in the second country, which could lead to a faster pace of technological progress than in the 
more populous country, following the insights from Kuznets (1960), Becker et al. (1999) and 
Gallup and Sachs (1998)
6; or higher population density increases the effective market size and 
thus raises the returns to innovation.  This is not only theoretically plausible but supported 
empirical by cross-country growth research (e.g. Gallup and Sachs, 1998; Bloom at al. 1999; 
Nestmann, 2000).  To see this formally, this idea will now be incorporated in the framework of 
Kremer’s generalized model.
In this version the land variable T will not be normalized to one in the production function. The 
production function from (1) is reproduced below.
  (1) a - a =
1 T P * A Y
After dividing (1) by P and rearranging the terms, we can identify the per capita production 













6 Gallup and Sachs (1998) differentiate between the effects of population density in the hinterland and in 
coastal regions.  The beneficial effects of population density only are supposed to appear in coastal regions.  
7This function can be interpreted as follows: The more people (P) work on a fixed land area 
(T), the lower will be the marginal productivity per head; conversely, the larger the land area 
(T), the higher is the marginal product of a person. As in Kremer’s model, it is also assumed 
here that population adjusts instantaneously to economic conditions.  Thus the equilibrium 















In this new version of the model, the growth rate of technology ( A A/  ) depends on research 
productivity per person, population size, the level of technology, and on population density. 
The research productivity per person g is multiplied by P to compute total research output in 
the economy. The level of technology A affects the growth rate non-linearly, as Jones 
(1992,1995) proposed. The variable d stands for population density, defined as population (P) 
divided by land area (T). 
(3b)  1 A * d * P * g
A
A - f b
·
=
The functional form of equation (3b) captures that not only population size but also population 
density influences the growth rate of technology.
7 The magnitude of the exponent ß will be 
determined with help of equation (5b).  
In the next step we compute the population growth rate. The growth rate of the land 
area T is equal to zero, as land area is fixed over time.
8  From the last section we know how to 
compute the growth rate of population out of (2) or (2b), respectively. Equation (4b) is 











Multiplying (4b) by T/T and substituting for  A A/    leads to the final equation (5b):
7 In our model we only consider technical progress and do not make allowances for technological regress due to 
either ‘depreciation’ of technical knowledge and/or falling populations.  Aiyar and Dalgaard (2001) provide a 
model, in which imperfect knowledge transfers from one generation to the next may result in technological 
regress. In particular, the model describes how technological levels might decrease due to a fall in population 
density which might explain technological regress in some historical and geographic circumstances.  These 
insights supplement our own analysis here which we believe is more relevant at the global level examined here. 
For a related discussion, see Kremer (1993)
8 The global land area has indeed not changed drastically over the past 1 million years and in this simple 
formulation of a global relationship, this assumption may be reasonable.  But see also discussion below about 



























Kremer assumes that the share of labor (a) in the production process is roughly two thirds; he 
also follows Jones in assuming that f < 1. Over most of human history, the growth rate of 
population was proportional to its size. Because of this observation, the exponent of P/T is 
supposed to be roughly equal or slightly less than one.
9 If it is true that:
1 ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 £ - f a - + b +
then, substituting the values for a and f leads to the prediction that ß is between zero and one. 
This can be interpreted as follows:   The influence of population density on technological 
change is positive but decreasing over time. The transfer of knowledge is faster, the higher 
population density becomes, but note that the speed of this transfer is not unlimited. Although 
the absolute value still increases over time, the marginal increase of the growth rate in 
technological diffusion declines. For a single country, its own level of technology may, at 
lower levels of population density, also be more influenced by population density than at higher 
levels. 
But population density does not only represent the diffusion of technology but also the 
need and the ability to use a new technology. Assuming that a certain population density is 
necessary to generate the demand for technological change and generate the requisite local 
market, this population density spurs technological change particularly for countries with low 
levels of technology. Similarly, higher density increases returns to investments in public goods 
such as power or other infrastructure (see Simon, 1977; Frederiksen, 1981), and these 
investments in turn could also work as catalysts for the rate of technological change. Once the 
infrastructure has been built, the influence of population density is concentrated only on the 
diffusion process and less on the demand factors and the basic infrastructure necessary for 
efficient technological spillovers, which could account for the falling marginal returns from 
population density.  Moreover, if population density becomes too high, the costs of selecting 
the right information increases and this could lower the benefits of a faster knowledge transfer. 
The inference from the empirical evidence, which lead to a positive but declining influence of 
population density on the growth rate of technology is consistent with these arguments.  
This version of the model can then be extended, as was Kremer’s, to no longer assume 
instantaneous adjustment of population to income levels.   If now population adjusts only 
9 If it were slightly less than one, it may also account for the fall in population growth after 1960 in Figure 1. 
But see also below.  
9slowly to rising incomes, it is possible for per capita incomes to increase, and these rising per-
capita incomes in turn reduce population growth (e.g. Becker 1981, Willis, 1973) and thus 
may generate the turning point observed in Figure 1.  In this version with population density, 
per capita income growth would be faster than in the Kremer version and also in line with 
observed income growth over the past century.  
Thus the inclusion of population density more plausibly explains the empirical findings 
on population and population growth through the above argument on the positive, but 
declining impact of population density on technological change. This explanation appears more 
plausible than Kremer’s original version which only turns on population levels and not on its 
density.
4. Empirical Tests and their Interpretation
Since global population density has changed, one for one, with global population (as 
the global land area has been roughly fixed over the past few millenia), the empirical tests of 
Kremer’s hypothesis apply to this formulation of the model as well and need not be replicated 
here but will only be briefly summarized.
10  Kremer shows that the linear relationship between 
population levels and its growth rate shows up econometrically and is robust to corrections for 
heteroscedasticity, different data sources for world population, and changes in time periods 
under investigation.  It not only holds for the entire world, but also when specific regions 
between which there was only limited exchange of technologies (e.g. Europe, China, and India) 
are considered separately.  In our interpretation, it was the rising population and the rising 
population density which ensured the acceleration of technological progress in the world, and 
the three regions, which then in turn relaxed the Malthusian constraint and allowed population 
levels to grow further.
11  
For the second part of Kremer’s empirical tests, however, our model has a different 
interpretation.   In that part, Kremer examines population and population density of five 
technologically separate regions around 1500 to test whether those regions with the lowest 
population indeed had the lowest population growth.  He shows that there appears to be a 
close correlation between population and technological levels in those five regions which 
10 For the aggregate analysis undertaken here, the assumption of a fixed land area appears reasonable.  If one 
were to examine technological change at a more disaggregated level, settlement patterns that shift the inhabited 
land areas as well as alter local population densities would be important to integrate to account for actual trends 
in technological change over space and time.  See also analysis of geographically separate regions below.
11 For details, refer to Kremer (1993) which also includes a careful discussion of the data sources and potential 
biases.
10separated around 10000 B.C.  The regions with the lowest population density, Tasmania and 
Flinder’s Island (where population appears to have died out about 6000 B.C), also had the 
lowest technological levels, while the much more populous Old World was the place with the 
highest level of technologies in 1500.   He also claims that the regions with the lowest 
population in 1500 must have had the lowest population growth up until 1500 since their 
population density in 1500 was lowest.  Table VII from his paper has been complemented with 
data on population and population density for AD1 and AD1000 and is shown  below as Table 
1.  His second claim hinges on the assumption that all five regions started out at the time of 
their separation (around 10,000 BC) with roughly the same population density.  Only with this 
assumption can the population density in 1500 say anything about population growth prior to 
that.  
Table 1: Population and Population Density in Technologically Separated Regions
Population Population Density
AD1 1000 1500 Area AD1 1000 1500
Old World 162.5 254 407 83.98 1.94 3.04 4.85
Americas 4.5 9 14 38.43 0.11 0.23 0.36
Australia 0.2 0.2 0.2 7.69 0.03 0.03 0.026
Tasmania 0.0012-0.005 0.068 0.018-0.074
Flinders Island 0 0.0068 0
Sub-Saharan Africa is included in the old world (which is otherwise comprised of Eurasia), since there was 
some contact across the Sahara.  There are a wide range of population estimates for the Americas and Australia 
at the time of European arrival, and McEvedy and Jones´s are at the low end. However, higher estimates would 
not affect the rank ordering.  Estimates for Tasmania are based on the Encyclopaedia Brittanica.  There are no 
reliable population estimates for Tasmania prior to 1500.
Source: Kremer (1993), McEvedy and Jones (1978).
Adding further data from McEvedy and Jones, which were used by Kremer in Table 1, 
question the empirical validity of this assumption.  Instead it appears that the Old World in 1 
AD, and also in 1000 AD had considerably higher population densities than the Americas and 
Australia.  While we do not know whether this was true already at the time of separation, the 
differences are so large that it is more than likely to have been the case.
12           
Using our model with population density, one can reinterpret the findings from Table 1 
more convincingly.  In particular, we no longer need to assume equal population densities at 
the time of separation but can replace that with the more realistic assumption that population 
12 Using alternative data from Clarke (1977) or from Durand (1977) supports the contention of vastly different 
population densities between the Old World and the Americas and Australia up until the earliest times.  This 
conclusion would be strengthened if one excluded Africa South of the Sahara from the Old World. Clark’s and 
Durand’s data have considerably higher numbers for the old world at AD1 and consequently lower population 
growth after that.
11density of these separate regions differed already at the time of separation, with the Old World 
already having the highest population density, and the Americas, Australia, Tasmania, and 
Flinder’s Island each having smaller population densities.  As a result, it was the low initial 
population density (in addition to low population) that ensured that the latter regions remained 
technologically backward, while the more densely settled Old World developed progressively 
better technologies.   The considerable differences in population growth between AD1 and 
AD1000 and AD1500 between the regions would support this conjecture.  Moreover, our 
model would clearly predict that the combination of higher population and higher population 
density in the Old World ensured that most technological progress the world has seen since 
1500 originated in that region (see also Boserup, 1981).  
Our model can  be further supported  by looking at more disaggregated data on 
population,   population   density  and   GDP   (as   a   proxy  for   the   level  of   technological 
development). Appendix Table 1 presents data on population and population density for 
several Western European countries separately and aggregated data for several regions such as 
Eastern Europe, the former USSR, Western Offshoots, Latin America and Africa, both in AD0 
and AD1000. The Table also shows data on PPP-adjusted real per capita GDP in AD1500 
from Maddison (2000). These new data confirm that the regions where technological progress 
took off around 1500, especially Italy and central Europe had significantly higher population 
densities than e.g. the United States, the former USSR or Africa, all being regions that can be 
considered technologically backward at that time. India and China have relatively high 
population densities and were countries with recurrent episodes of high technological progress, 
although both were not particularly wealthy in 1500.
In fact, Figure 2 and the regressions in Table 2 demonstrate a close correspondence 
between population density in AD0 (or in AD1000) and per capita GDP in 1500, suggesting 
that more densely populated regions experienced greater technological progress after 1000, 
when (according to Maddison) the divergence in per capita incomes between countries began 
to emerge.  The strong and highly significant influence of population density on subsequent 
technological change is robust to whether we use density in AD0 or AD1000, and whether we 
include or exclude some outliers.
13 
13 When we remove outliers (Italy and India in AD0 and India and Japan in AD1000), the influence of 
population density becomes much stronger and explains a surprisingly large share of the variation in per capita 
incomes in 1500.  Arguably it is useful to remove at least Italy and India from the regressions as they were 
experiencing a high point of a particular imperial period in AD0 (Italy and India) and Ad 1000 (India), leading 
to unusually high population concentrations.  
12At the same time, we observe from Figure 3 that the correlation between population size 
in AD0 (or AD1000) and per capita GDP in AD1500 is close to zero. This supports our 
contention population size alone was not primarily responsible for technological change, while 
population density clearly played an important role; in fact, the data seem to suggest it played a 
more important role than population size.  











0 5 10 15 20
Source: McEvedy and Jones (1978), Maddison (2001), and World Bank (2002).  Note that two outliers (India 
and Japan) are excluded.  As shown in the Table, they affect the correlation only marginally.  
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Source: McEvedy and Jones (1978); Maddison (2001), and World Bank (2002).  Note that two outliers (India 
and China) are excluded.  As shown in the Table, they affect the correlation only marginally.  
Table 2: Population, Population Density, and Per Capita GDP in 1500













Pop.   Dens.  17.8*** 29.8***
13AD0 (4.0) (4.6)












Adj. R-Sq. 0.36 0.46 0.25 0.70 -0.04 -0.02
N 27 25 27 25 27 27
 Note: Dependent variable is PPP adjusted per capita GDP for 1500. Regressions with * exclude outliers. 
Dropping outliers from regressions 3 and 4 did not change the results.  Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. 
***refers to 99.9%, **to 99%, and * to 95% significance.    
Source: Observations based on Maddison (2001).
5. Conclusion 
This note incorporates population density as an additional determinant of technological 
change within the framework of Kremer’s (1993) model.   While population increases the 
number of potential suppliers of new technology, population density generates the linkages, the 
infrastructure, the demand, and the effective market size for technological innovations.  The 
model and the available data suggest a concave relationship between population density and 
technological change.  This model is able to better explain the empirical relationship between 
population, population density, and population growth, and can provide a better account of the 
differences in technological levels between geographically separate regions than the account 
provided by Kremer (1993).  
The revised model not only explains the historical record in a more plausible fashion, 
but also has interesting implications for understanding differences in growth and development 
among different parts of the developing world.  For example, a conclusion of this model is that 
Africa’s development challenge is particularly difficult given its combination of a relatively low 
population levels at the beginning of modern economic growth combined with a very low 
population density both of which hamper technological change and diffusion.  The rapid 
population growth Africa is currently experiencing might in time reduce this burden and ease 
technological change and diffusion, but only at high current costs that such high population 
growth entails.
14  Conversely, economic development in Asia was greatly aided by high 
populations and large population densities that facilitated technological change and diffusion. 
Regarding policy implications, our findings suggest that effort should be directed at 
14 For a related discussion, see Gallup and Sachs (1998).  Low population density might have other negative 
effects such as greater ethnic divisions which has also been found to reduce economic growth (Easterly and 
Levine, 1997).  At the same time, it is not clear whether high population densities are still as essential as they 
used to be given that modern transport and communication technologies offer, if available, greater 
technological diffusion even without high population densities.  But also here, Africa seriously lags behind.
14overcoming the limits and constraints imposed by low population density.  Policies aimed at 
improving the physical and technological infrastructure would clearly be important in this 
regard.    
15Appendix: Table 1













Austria 84 500 700 5.95 8.33 707
Belgium 31 300 400 9.68 12.90 875
Denmark 43 180 360 4.19 8.37 738
Finland 338 20 40 0.06 0.11 453
France 552 5000 6500 9.06 11.77 727
Germany 357 3000 3500 8.40 9.80 676
Italy 301 7000 5000 23.26 16.61 1100
Netherlands 42 200 300 4.76 7.14 754
Norway 324 100 200 0.31 0.61 640
Sweden 450 200 400 0.44 0.88 695
Switzerland 41 300 300 7.32 7.31 742
United Kingdom 243 800 2000 3.29 8.23 714
Portugal 92 500 600 5.43 6.52 632
Spain 506 4500 4000 8.89 7.95 698
Western Europe* 3404 22600 24300 6.64 7.14 774
Eastern Europe ** 786 4750 6500 6.04 8.27 462
Former USSR*** 24971 3900 7100 0.16 0.28 500
United States 9629 680 1300 0.07 0.13 400
Other Western Offshoots **** 17983 490 660 0.03 0.03 400
Total Western Offshoots 27612 1170 1960 0.04 0.07 400
Mexico 1958 2200 4500 1.12 2.29 425
Other Latin America ***** 18501 3400 6900 0.18 0.25 410
Total Latin America 20459 5600 11400 0.27 0.55 416
Japan 378 3000 7500 7.94 19.84 500
China 9598 59600 59000 6.21 6.14 600
India 3287 75000 75000 22.82 22.81 550
Africa 28821 16500 33000 0.57 1.14 400
World 110200 230820 268273 2.09 2.43 565
Notes:*Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Portugal, and Spain. **Comprising of 
Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and former Yugoslavia. *** Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. **** Australia, New Zealand, Canada. ***** Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Puerto 
Rico, Trinidad & Tobago.
Sources: Surface Area was taken from the World Development Indicators 2002. Population figures as well as GDP data was taken from Maddison (2001). Population density 
was calculated by dividing total population by surface area.
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